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THE SEMANTICS OF SIN TAX:  
POLITICS, MORALITY, AND FISCAL IMPOSITION 
Bruce G. Carruthers* 
INTRODUCTION 
By encouraging some activities while discouraging others, governments 
use laws to shape individual and collective human behavior.1  The most 
extreme discouragement comes as outright legal prohibition, with severe 
penalties to be rigorously imposed on violators of the proscription.  
Moderate penalties combined with lax enforcement constitute a gentler way 
to discourage illegal activity.  Yet there are other, even less stringent ways 
to deal with unwanted behavior.  Legal but morally problematic market-
based activities can be discouraged through the price system:  the 
imposition of a government tax raises prices and makes the taxed activity 
more expensive for participants to undertake.2  Depending on the price 
elasticity of demand,3 higher prices then reduce market activity.  Examples 
of such problematic but legal activities in the United States include:  
alcohol consumption, tobacco consumption, and gambling.  Other dubious 
activities that have been legalized very recently, or selectively, include 
consumption of marijuana (e.g., in Colorado)4 and use of sexual services 
(e.g., brothels in Nevada).5  Across all such disapproved, but still legal 
 
*  John D. MacArthur Chair and Professor of Sociology, Northwestern University.  My 
thanks to Tom Kerby for his very able research assistance, to the participants at the Fordham 
Law Review symposium entitled We Are What We Tax for their helpful feedback, and to 
Laura K. Nelson for her comments.  For an overview of the symposium, see Mary Louise 
Fellows, Grace Heinecke & Linda Sugin, Foreword:  We Are What We Tax, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2413 (2016). 
 
 1. Monica Prasad, Taxation As a Regulatory Tool:  Lessons from Environmental Taxes 
in Europe, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS:  TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 363 
(Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010). 
 2. See Anthony Ogus, Corrective Taxes and Financial Impositions As Regulatory 
Instruments, 61 MOD. L. REV. 767, 770 (1998) (noting that in addition to criminal law and 
taxation, tort law can be used to regulate unwanted behavior). 
 3. This is a measure of how demand for a good or service changes when its price 
changes. 
 4. John Hudak, Colorado’s Rollout of Legal Marijuana Is Succeeding, BROOKINGS 
INST. (July 31, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2014/07/colorado-
marijuana-legalization-succeeding [https://perma.cc/FHU6-NU98]. 
 5. Barbara G. Brents & Katherine Hausbeck, State-Sanctioned Sex:  Negotiating 
Formal and Informal Regulatory Practices in Nevada Brothels, 44 PAC. SOC. PERSP. 307, 
312–14 (2001). 
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activities, the taxes imposed are simply known as “sin taxes.”6  They are 
segregated from other revenues and frequently have been used to fund 
“motherhood and apple pie” expenditures. 
In this Article, I consider how negative social meanings can be projected 
through public revenue systems and propose to examine the link between 
taxation and representation in a new light.7  First, I discuss how social 
meanings are attached to money and then explain how, through the use of 
earmarking, this works in the case of tax revenues.  I next briefly review the 
history of sin taxes at both the state and federal levels.  Finally, I use 
computational linguistic methods to suggest that the fiscal significance of 
sin taxes, and their cultural significance, are loosely coupled. 
In capitalist democratic societies, taxes concern monetary flows from 
taxpayers in the private economy into state coffers.  The sociology of 
money offers insights into how money and monetary flows gain social 
meaning and significance.  Viviana Zelizer argues against theoretical 
perspectives that view money as an abstract and fungible measure of value 
undergirding rational calculation (in the maximization of expected payoffs, 
for example).8  Furthermore, she questions the idea that the introduction of 
money was socially transformational because it had the effect of 
neutralizing or dissolving preexisting social relations (recall Karl Marx’s 
famous critique of the “cash nexus”).9  Rather than simply imposing a one-
dimensional measure onto complex social realities, Zelizer claims that 
money is an instrument of collective expression; rather than erasing 
meanings, it can bear them.10  This primarily is accomplished through a 
variety of earmarking and labeling practices that place money into 
qualitatively distinct categories of varying semantic valence.  Zelizer’s 
evidence for this monetary production of meaning is mostly drawn from the 
domestic sphere and from the arena of pin money11 and familial 
budgeting.12  Here, I propose to take her basic insight and apply it to the 
sphere of public finance.  Because imposition of a tax requires some 
categorical specificity that also occurs with earmarking, the social meaning 
 
 6. I distinguish these from “sinful” taxes where someone objects to the imposition of a 
particular tax and attaches a derogatory label in order to signal their unhappiness.  For 
example, opponents of the federal estate tax refer to it as the “death tax,” as if death itself 
were being taxed.  I will focus on “sin taxes,” rather than “sinful taxes.” 
 7. I am setting aside the important but separate framing effects involved in the basic act 
of labeling public revenues and whether they are classified as “taxes,” “fees,” or “fines.” 
 8. See generally VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005); VIVIANA A. 
ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1994) [hereinafter ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL 
MEANING OF MONEY]; Viviana A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money:  “Special 
Monies”, 95 AM. J. SOC. 342 (1989). 
 9. See, e.g., KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 53 (1998). 
 10. See Zelizer, supra note 8, at 350–51. 
 11. “Pin money” refers to small sums given by a husband to a wife, the use of which is 
subject to her discretion, but typically it will be devoted to household expenditures. 
 12. See ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY, supra note 8, at 27.  Her claims are 
consistent with later work in behavioral economics on “mental accounting.” See generally 
Eldar Shafir & Richard H. Thaler, Invest Now, Drink Later, Spend Never:  On the Mental 
Accounting of Delayed Consumption, 27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 694 (2006); Richard H. Thaler, 
Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 183 (1999). 
2016] THE SEMANTICS OF SIN TAX 2567 
of an activity can migrate to a tax that is imposed on that activity and to the 
revenues that it generates.13  Taxes can represent meaning. 
Some economic activities operate under a weight of heavy moral 
disapproval:  they may not be illegal, but nevertheless they are 
stigmatized.14  Their censured status is reflected not only in public attitudes 
and behavior, but also in public policy.  Setting aside other regulatory 
measures, heavy taxes imposed on the consumption of tobacco products and 
alcoholic beverages, or participation in gambling, serve the dual purpose of 
raising revenue and discouraging consumption.  Such taxes are known as 
sumptuary or sin taxes.15  The imposition of sin taxes raises market prices, 
and by working through prices, these taxes attempt to regulate behavior:  
higher prices reduce demand, just as lower prices expand it.  This dual 
purpose has been recognized for some time.  For example, in a 
Temperance-era discussion of the social problems caused by alcohol in 
Switzerland, Watson Milliet proposed imposing federal and cantonal taxes 
on distilled liquors as an effective way to raise prices, thus encouraging 
Swiss drinkers to consume wine or beer rather than stronger alcoholic 
drinks.16  Drinking was legal but problematic, and excise taxes were a way 
to mitigate the problem.  Similarly, in the United States, alcohol and 
tobacco were deemed socially undesirable commodities, which created a 
good reason to tax them.17 
Contemporary economics is seldom concerned with sin and stigma.18  
But economics does have a framework with which to analyze and even 
justify sin taxes.  As James R. Hines explains, taxes can be used to correct 
for externalities, a type of market failure.19  If consumption of a good or 
service entails social costs that are not fully reflected in the market price, 
then imposition of an excise tax can be socially beneficial.20  For example, 
if consumption of cigarettes causes damage to nonsmokers via secondhand 
 
 13. Therefore, I take issue with perspectives such as that of the Emperor Vespasian, who 
observed to his son Titus that the revenues generated by a tax on urinals nevertheless did not 
smell of urine, neither figuratively nor literally. See GAIUS SUETONIUS TRANQUILLUS, THE 
TWELVE CAESARS 285 (E.V. Rieu ed., Robert Graves trans., Penguin Books 1957) (121). 
 14. I recognize, of course, that culture is not monolithic and that groups often vary in 
their perceptions of stigma.  For example, even when the U.S. Temperance movement was at 
its strongest, wine continued to play a key role in legitimate religious rituals and practices of 
groups.  Moreover, through widespread noncompliance, many people contested the 
prohibition against alcohol. 
 15. See, e.g., Cathy M. Johnson & Kenneth J. Meier, The Wages of Sin:  Taxing 
America’s Legal Vices, 43 W. POL. Q. 577 (1990). 
 16. Watson Milliet, The Alcohol Question in Switzerland, 3 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 37, 44–45 (1893). 
 17. See generally JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, THEIR FAIR SHARE:  TAXING THE RICH IN THE 
AGE OF FDR 235 (2013). 
 18. For an exception, see Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance As a Constraint on Markets, 21 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 37 (2007).  As an example, Roth discusses measures like the prohibition 
against the consumption of dog meat, which are founded on widespread repugnance and not 
simply on personal preference or concern for food safety. Id. at 37. 
 19. James R. Hines, Jr., Taxing Consumption and Other Sins, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 64 
(2007). 
 20. For a forceful argument in favor of doing just this, see George A. Hacker, Taxing 
Booze for Health and Wealth, 6 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 701, 701–08 (1987). 
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smoke, then the market price of cigarettes will not reflect their full cost to 
people who neither bought nor sold the cigarettes.  Similarly, if alcohol 
consumption involves social costs (including increased traffic accidents, 
fetal alcohol syndrome, and other problems associated with alcoholism) that 
are borne by people who do not consume alcohol, then the market price of 
alcohol is too low.21  Such a tax, sometimes called a “Pigouvian tax,” can 
help “internalize” such externalities.22 
Sin taxes face a number of complications.  Whether they are imposed for 
moral, fiscal, or technical reasons, at some point higher taxes also increase 
the incentive to evade taxation and so can spur the growth of illegal or black 
market transactions.  With too heavy of a fiscal burden, stigmatized legal 
activity shifts to where it becomes invisible to the state, and the state can 
neither track nor receive benefits from it.  At the extreme, the ability of 
taxation to suppress activity has its limits.  Ironically, governments acquire 
a financial interest in activity that they otherwise condemn:  if alcohol 
consumption is too successfully reduced, the government may lose a valued 
source of tax revenue.23  In similar fashion, the profits generated by 
stigmatized activity are deemed “ill-gotten gains” and also can become 
stigmatized.24  Markets for such goods are often regulated in other ways 
that reflect concern about their broader social effects or their stigmatized 
status.  For example, a regulatory agency may require producers and sellers 
to acquire a license to operate,25 or a statute may restrict buyers of such 
products by age (e.g., prohibitions against underage drinking and smoking).  
Although sin taxes are not the only way that public policy responds to or 
manages stigmatized activity, they will be my primary focus here. 
Of course, taxes can also be used to signal positive social meanings, and 
not simply through nonimposition.  In the political debates about welfare 
reform in the 1990s, for example, much was made of the virtues of “honest 
labor.”26  In contrast to those who “chose” not to work and looked to 
government for financial support (thus participating in the culture of 
“welfare dependency”), the working poor were celebrated for their 
 
 21. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1938).  Long before A.C. Pigou, 
some noneconomists had a similar insight.  Consider a New Hampshire newspaper article 
supporting a proposed excise tax on liquor, which observes that even if the tax did not 
reduce consumption,  “dealers in and consumers of the stuff would pay a larger proportion of 
the criminal and pauper expenses directly traceable to them.” See Gen. Marston’s 
Temperance Bill, INDEP. STATESMEN, June 23, 1881. 
 22. William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. 
REV. 307, 308–09 (1972); Ogus, supra note 2, at 768.  Taxes also have been proposed as a 
way to deal with environmental externalities, although the taxed behavior tends not to have 
the strong moral connotations of “sin.” See, e.g., Thomas A. Barthold, Issues in the Design 
of Environmental Excise Taxes, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 134–40 (1994). 
 23. See Prasad, supra note 1, at 370. 
 24. Bruce G. Carruthers & Wendy Nelson Espeland, Money, Meaning and Morality, 41 
AM. BEHAV. SCI. 1384, 1389 (1998). 
 25. In this case, governments can then restrict licenses to those who meet some kind of 
minimal standards for activity, legitimacy, accountability, or suitability. 
 26. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics:  The Political 
History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969–99, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 983, 985 (2000). 
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independence, uprightness, and sense of personal responsibility.27  So even 
as entitlement programs like Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) were abolished and overall social welfare supports were reduced, 
federal policy used the personal income tax system to reward the paid labor 
of the working poor.28  Expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
gave tax credits (not merely tax deductions) to low income individuals 
based on their income level and number of children.29  In short, tax 
expenditures were used to mark and reward poor people who undertook 
paid labor.30  Similarly, home mortgage interest tax deductions reflect a 
widespread political consensus about the positive social value of individual 
home ownership.31  Other income tax measures reflect social approval of, 
among other things, entrepreneurship, charitable contributions, savings, and 
capital gains.32  The tax code can reflect both sin and virtue. 
I.  TAXATION AND REPRESENTATION 
How can a public revenue system serve as an instrument of cultural 
expression or as a vehicle with which to represent meaning?  Presumably, 
there are other and better ways for a society to state its collective values, 
and surely the basic purpose of the revenue system is to generate the 
resources needed to fund government activity as efficiently as possible.  To 
consider that taxes might have other purposes or effects beside simple 
resource extraction entails moving beyond perspectives that regard 
governments and sovereigns as primarily revenue maximizers,33 or which 
posit a tight link between taxation, warmaking, and the growth of the 
state.34  Of course, revenue extraction usually is the main purpose of 
taxation, but here I only wish to observe that it need not be the only 
consideration.  Taxes can be used to regulate behavior, to change behavior, 
or to mark behavior.35  So here I will not focus on the extractive side of 
taxation, except to note its loose connection with the cultural side. 
 
 27. Id. at 993–94. 
 28. Id. 
 29. For a much more extensive discussion of this and related matters, see Tsilly Dagan, 
The Currency of Taxation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2016). 
 30. CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE:  TAX EXPENDITURES AND 
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 64–69 (1997); Christopher Howard, The Hidden Side 
of the American Welfare State, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 403, 425–26 (1993). 
 31. HOWARD, supra note 30, at 93. 
 32. This is not to say, of course, that all tax expenditures are markers of public approval.  
Many are simply the result of interest group lobbying or narrow political favors. 
 33. See, e.g., MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE 10 (1988); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, 
STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 23–25 (1981). 
 34. See, e.g., CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES, AD 990–
1990, at 67–70 (1990). 
 35. Taxes also can be used in other ways.  Ronald King offers a telling detail when he 
recounts that when President Taft sought a corporation excise tax, the goal was not so much 
to generate tax revenue as to regulate business accounting practices, which is quite a 
different matter. See Ronald Frederick King, From Redistributive to Hegemonic Logic:  The 
Transformation of American Tax Politics, 1894–1963, 12 POL. & SOC’Y 1, 17 (1983).  Or 
consider that state-chartered bank notes were taxed after the Civil War in order to encourage 
the formation of national banks in support of Union finance. See BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & 
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For market activity, certain associations can engender stigma or create a 
problematic measure of illegitimacy.  First of all, in accordance with some 
social value systems, particular goods and market-based activities are 
simply classified as “wrongful.”  They are associated with immorality, 
personal corruption, violation of religious codes, impurities of intent, 
inappropriate outcomes, and so on.  The stigmatization increases when 
those goods and activities are deemed luxuries rather than necessities.  That 
is, the moral valence intensifies when consumption is a matter of individual 
choice, when it is a personal option rather than a requirement.  Under such 
conditions, those who indulge in such wrongful behavior or who acquire 
“tainted” goods do so of their own free will and without mitigating 
circumstances or a compelling external reason why they did so. 
When deployed as a fiscal burden that encumbers a particular activity, 
taxation can serve as a public marker of stigma.  The tax publicly labels 
disapproved goods or services and can be imposed at exactly that point in 
the production chain where the good is created out of its constituent parts, 
or after its production and somewhere further downstream (perhaps when 
the good is sold, or the service provided, to consumers).  Thus, as symbolic 
expressions of disapproval, excise taxes can be highly precise, 
differentiating sharply between good and bad commodities and even 
between the components of a commodity (e.g., glass, corn, wheat, rye, 
malted barley), and the commodity itself (e.g., bottled bourbon whiskey).  
And the tax can signal social disapproval even when it generates no actual 
revenue.  Consider, for example, that the stigma attached to alcohol was 
such that liquor taxes remained on the books, as a public—if largely 
nonapplicable—expression of disapproval even during Prohibition.36 
The imposition of taxes on “luxuries” rather than “necessities” has 
implications for the perception of tax incidence.37  Luxury goods connote 
waste, excess, and discretionary consumption—a set of associations that 
certainly have shaped tax policy.38  Consider, for example, how much New 
Deal-era discussions of luxury taxes depended on the perceived status of 
various goods:  jewelry and furs were easy to classify as luxury goods.39  
Necessary goods, by contrast, are nondiscretionary, and their consumption 
 
LAURA ARIOVICH, MONEY AND CREDIT:  A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 31 (2010); Prasad, 
supra note 1, at 370.  Additionally, note that taxation plays a metrological role in the 
definition and measurement of product qualities and standards. See WILLIAM J. ASHWORTH, 
CUSTOMS AND EXCISE:  TRADE, PRODUCTION, AND CONSUMPTION IN ENGLAND, 1640–1845, at 
7 (2003); Clark Byse, Alcoholic Beverage Control Before Repeal, 7 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
544, 552–53 (1940); John E. O’Neill, Federal Activity in Alcoholic Beverage Control, 7 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 570, 585–89 (1940). 
 36. Jendi B. Reiter, Citizens or Sinners?—The Economic and Political Inequity of “Sin 
Taxes” on Tobacco and Alcohol Products, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 443, 448 (1996). 
 37. Although the meaning of “luxury” changes over time, beer and tobacco clearly were 
lumped together as “luxuries” in a San Francisco newspaper article on the excise tax 
imposed on beer production. See Letter from New York, S.F. DAILY EVENING BULL., Dec. 16, 
1862.  Going forward, they are consistently classified as non-necessities. 
 38. Reginald Lennard, The Taxation of Luxury, 28 ECON. J. 287, 290, 294 (1918). 
 39. See THORNDIKE, supra note 17, at 63–64, 82–83, 235. 
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is consistent with thrift and the careful husbandry of resources.40  In 
addition, however, luxuries generally are consumed by high-income 
individuals while necessities are consumed by everyone.  This means that 
taxes on luxuries should be relatively “progressive” (so that higher income 
individuals pay higher consumption taxes), but taxes on necessities are 
more “regressive” in that lower-income individuals bear a proportionately 
higher burden.  It also suggests that, if they so choose, those who consume 
luxury goods easily could reduce their consumption in response to higher 
prices, particularly when substitute goods are readily available.41  By 
contrast, the consumption of necessary goods will not decline even if the 
imposition of taxes raises the price.  By definition, there are no substitutes 
for something that truly is necessary. 
Following Tsilly Dagan’s discussion of income taxes,42 the imposition of 
excise taxes on stigmatized activity also has the effect of giving a precise 
measure to sinful activity:  the more activity, the higher the tax, in exact 
proportion.  Just as personal income taxes recognize and give quantitative 
measure to various human attributes, resources, and interactions, excise 
taxes are also a precise numerical measure to stigmatized consumption.  
This occurs only when stigmatized activity involves the purchase or the use 
of market-based goods and services, both of which necessarily possess a 
market price.  Depending on how it is imposed, whether in terms of value 
(e.g., as a percent added to the price), or some physical measure (e.g., per 
liquid gallon or per carton), a sin tax commensurates stigmatized activity 
even if it does not commodify it.  Someone who more frequently engages in 
taxed behavior pays a higher penalty that someone who does not engage in 
it at all.  And tax levels can differentiate between degrees of stigmatization 
within the same overall product category.  For example, the alcohol taxes 
imposed on the purchase of beer or wine frequently are lower than those 
imposed on distilled spirits (so-called “hard liquor”).  The latter beverage 
has a higher alcohol content and so is considered more problematic.  
Stigmatized activity that occurs outside of the market economy, and which 
therefore does not have a market price, cannot be commensurated in this 
fashion (e.g., actions like telling lies, wishing ill of someone else, 
embarrassing one’s family, etc.). 
One can understand why those who participate in stigmatized activities 
are not in a strong position to object to the taxation of such activities.  To be 
perceived as illegitimate is a weak basis for tax resistance.  But rather than 
avoid taxes, participants tarnished by stigma may actually seek out taxation 
because it can, in a sense, become a form of political protection.43  Consider 
 
 40. As Adam Smith noted:  “Sugar, rum, and tobacco are commodities which are 
nowhere necessaries of life, which are become [sic] objects of almost universal consumption, 
and which are therefore extremely proper subjects of taxation.” 39 ADAM SMITH, AN 
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 416 (1952). 
 41. It turns out, of course, that even low-income individuals enjoy a drink and a smoke 
and that excise taxes imposed on such items generally are regressive. 
 42. See Dagan, supra note 29. 
 43. AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE:  LAW, 
POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929, at 74–75 (2013). 
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the political power of U.S. prohibitionists who wanted to completely curtail 
the nonmedical consumption of alcoholic beverages and managed to do so 
during the Prohibition era (1920 to 1933).  In consenting to be taxed both 
before and after Prohibition, distillers and brewers gave state and federal 
governments a good fiscal reason not to follow the prohibitionists and 
completely prohibit alcohol.44  And the higher the tax rates and the more 
lucrative and reliable the revenues, the stronger the reason not to follow the 
prohibitionists.  This willingness to be taxed, however, hardly can explain 
the emergence of sin taxes. 
II.  TAXES AS EARMARKS 
In explaining the cultural significance of money, Viviana Zelizer places a 
great deal of emphasis on earmarking practices.45  These insert distinctions 
into what is otherwise indistinguishable, or fungible, money.  Modern legal 
tender is homogeneous:  it varies quantitatively ($10 = $5 + $5; $10 > $5) 
but not qualitatively ($1 = $1).  Earmarks create qualitative differences 
within the homogeneity.46  According to Zelizer, “The earmarking of 
money is thus a social process:  money is attached to a variety of social 
relations rather than to individuals.”47  A traditional American housewife 
who covers household expenses with a monthly allowance she receives 
from her traditional breadwinner husband might set aside a portion of that 
sum into a domestic category known as “pin money.”48  Thus categorized, 
pin money is frequently earmarked for distinctive purposes and has a 
qualitatively different meaning.  People also physically segregate and label 
accumulations of money by putting them into piggy banks, jars, or 
stockings, and then treat that money differently (it might be designated for 
specific recreational uses or purchase of gifts) and not as part of the overall 
household budget. 
The imposition of taxes upon a particular type of transaction or 
commodity functions very much like an earmark.  The specific sourcing of 
tax revenue inserts categorical distinctions into fungible cash flow.  Instead 
of generic revenue, the government receives revenue from alcohol sales or 
revenue from cigarette sales, or taxes on casino gambling.  Domestic 
earmarking for Zelizer concerned symbolic designations or physical 
sequestration of monies.49  But matters necessarily are different where 
public and private sector organizations are concerned.  For these 
organizations, earmarking concerns budgetary categorizations.50  Otherwise 
identical legal tender becomes heterogeneous once it has been earmarked 
 
 44. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA:  A SHORT HISTORY 33 
(2004). 
 45. See ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY, supra note 8, at 143. 
 46. In its original meaning, ranchers marked the ears of their cattle in order to 
distinguish them from cattle owned by other ranchers. 
 47. See id. at 25. 
 48. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 49. See ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY, supra note 8, at 39. 
 50. ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, WHEN FORMALITY WORKS:  AUTHORITY AND 
ABSTRACTION IN LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS 126–29 (2001). 
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and placed into different budget categories.  It is important to recognize that 
this is a different matter than the incidence of taxation, which concerns who 
bears the ultimate financial burden of a tax.  If the party that directly pays a 
tax can pass the fiscal burden on to someone else (perhaps by charging 
higher prices to their customers), then the incidence is shifted elsewhere. 
At the symbolic level, the proximate point of fiscal imposition imparts 
meaning to sin tax revenue.  What is the social status of the underlying 
market transaction?  Is it legitimate, or illegitimate (even if legal)?  The 
answer shapes how taxes on that transaction are perceived.  Thus, a tax on 
legal prostitution becomes a sin tax, even if the burden of the tax ultimately 
falls on the (often) nonstigmatized customers who, because of the tax, will 
pay a higher price for the sexual services they purchase.  Collateral 
transactions also escape the symbolism that is attached to the focal 
transaction.  A tax on hotel room occupancy carries no problematic 
meaning, even if prostitutes rent hotel rooms to offer their services to 
clients.  Similarly, the taint of alcohol does not affect those who produce 
and sell the glass containers for alcoholic beverages, and so a bottle tax is 
not necessarily a sin tax. 
How sin tax revenues are used creates another opportunity for 
earmarking, particularly when this helps to “launder” the revenues.  Money 
that arises out of one set of market transactions subsequently can be used to 
fund an entirely different set of transactions (it is, after all, in the nature of 
money to circulate).  Money flows link together transactions of different 
moral valence, and the following transaction can modify the meaning of its 
predecessor.  “Dirty” money may be “cleansed” by being earmarked to 
serve a virtuous social end.  Perhaps tobacco revenues are spent on public 
health or to further children’s education.  Such earmarking introduces 
further symbolic categorical distinctions into what is otherwise purely 
fungible money and is a long-standing practice in American public finance.  
Charles Conlon points out that in the middle of the twentieth century, U.S. 
states often earmarked alcoholic beverage tax revenues for activities like 
old age pensions, schools, charitable institutions, and support of poor 
children.51  More recently, in 2005, twenty-six states earmarked their 
tobacco tax revenues, twenty-three states earmarked alcoholic beverage tax 
revenues, and fourteen states earmarked their tax revenues from gaming for 
purposes that included education, health, and welfare.52  For instance, the 
state of Alabama earmarked 32.4 percent of the tax revenues generated by 
the sale of liquor and wine for social and protective services and 40 percent 
of the revenues generated by beer sales for public schools and higher 
education.53  California earmarked 86.9 percent of taxes on the sale of 
cigarettes and tobacco products for a broad range of good works, including 
tobacco-related health education programs, disease research, environmental 
 
 51. Charles F. Conlon, Taxation in the Alcoholic Beverage Field, 7 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 728, 745–46 (1940). 
 52. ARTURO PÉREZ, EARMARKING STATE TAXES app. B, at 6 (2008). 
 53. Id. app. D, at 9. 
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conservation, fire prevention, and indigent health care services.54  It is 
easier to tolerate sinful activities if they can be credibly used for good, and 
budgetary earmarks can tie particular taxes to particular expenditures.55 
If, as Zelizer argues,56 earmarks create meaning within fungible 
monetary flows, then sin tax revenues constitute a double semantic process.  
On the origin or revenue side, taxation of stigmatized activity shares the 
stigma with the tax revenues, while at the same time mitigating that stigma 
because the problematic activity is now directly and publicly burdened with 
a tax.  The tax expresses disapproval while at the same time allowing the 
activity to proceed.  On the destination or spending side, budgetary 
earmarks can further mitigate the stigma by ensuring that at least some sin 
tax revenues support valuable and praiseworthy public policies.  Putting 
problematic revenues in tight linkage with legitimate activity creates a kind 
of halo effect. 
III.  VARIABLE TAXES AND DURABLE SEMANTICS 
Definitions of sin shift over time, as does the application of the term 
“stigmatized.”  The mobility of cultural meaning clearly is illustrated by the 
changing status of alcoholic beverages, which for a time were sanctioned to 
the point of being completely illegal.  Similarly, as awareness of the health 
hazards associated with tobacco consumption spread, the status of 
commodities like cigarettes became increasingly problematic. 
In the United States, the fiscal importance of “sin taxes” also has varied 
over time and across levels of government.  At the federal level, sin taxes 
generally have declined in importance as a revenue source.57  For much of 
the nineteenth century, the federal government depended on customs taxes 
for most of its revenue.58  Then, in the early twentieth century, there was a 
dramatic shift toward internal revenue sources, which included various 
excise taxes.  But the shift away from customs revenues did not make sin 
taxes more important.  In 1902, for example, the federal government 
derived roughly 29 percent of its total revenues from a sales tax on 
alcoholic beverages and about 7.5 percent of revenues from sales taxes on 
tobacco.59  In 1913, those proportions had changed to 23 percent for alcohol 
 
 54. Id. app. D, at 20. 
 55. For a more general discussion of budgetary earmarking, see IRENE S. RUBIN, THE 
POLITICS OF PUBLIC BUDGETING:  GETTING AND SPENDING 43–44, 163 (5th ed. 2006).  For an 
overview of state-level earmarking, see PÉREZ, supra note 52, at 2–8. 
 56. See ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY, supra note 8, at 5, 18–19. 
 57. See MEHROTRA, supra note 43, at 7, 72. 
 58. See infra APPENDIX Figure 1.  The author created Figure 1 based on the statistics 
found in John Joseph Wallis, Federal Government Revenue, by Source:  1789–1939, HIST. 
STAT. U.S. tbl.Ea588-593, http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/essay/showtableessay.do? 
id=Ea588-593&swidth=1366 (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/GJW6-X2YL]. 
 59. The majority of the percentages in this and the following paragraph are derived from 
the Historical Statistics of the United States. See John Joseph Wallis, Federal Government 
Revenue, by Source:  1902–1995, HIST. STAT. OF U.S. tbl.Ea132-159, http://hsus. 
cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/essay/showtableessay.do?id=Ea132-159&swidth=1600# (last 
visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/5X4L-CDDL]. 
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and 8 percent for tobacco.60  Prohibition greatly reduced revenues from sale 
of alcohol, but in 1934, shortly after repeal, the federal revenue proportions 
were 6.4 percent for alcohol sales and 10.9 percent for tobacco sales.61  By 
1948, during the post-war economic boom and after expansion of the 
personal income tax system during World War II, sales of alcoholic 
beverages and tobacco products contributed only 4.7 percent and 2.7 
percent, respectively to federal government revenues.62  And twenty years 
later, the proportions were even smaller:  2.6 percent and 1.3 percent, 
respectively.63 
One of the major causes of the overall decline at the federal level had 
nothing to do with changing social meanings, or changes in consumption of 
“sinful” commodities, but rather with wartime changes in taxation.  At the 
start of both World Wars I and II, the U.S. government had to raise much 
greater sums of money than before, and, in addition to borrowing heavily, 
the only direction to go in was to impose new types of personal income, 
corporate income, excise, or estate taxes.64  Extant tax revenues simply 
could not be expanded high enough, or fast enough, to meet the 
extraordinary fiscal needs of modern warfare.65  The outbreak of war was 
marked by a rapid decline in the relative importance of customs tax 
revenues, primarily because of the decline in international trade.66  Relative 
to total revenues, sin tax revenues also decreased.  As Figure 2 shows, taxes 
on alcoholic beverages were a major contributor to the federal 
government’s internal revenues during the late nineteenth century.67  But 
then they shrank dramatically as various income tax revenues expanded.  In 
general terms, federal revenues between the Civil War and World War I 
depended on a combination of customs and internal revenues.68  After 
World War I, internal revenues became more important chiefly because of 
 
 60. See sources cited supra note 59. 
 61. See sources cited supra note 59. 
 62. See THORNDIKE, supra note 17, at 264. 
 63. See John Joseph Wallis, Federal Government Internal Tax Revenue, by Source:  
1863–1940, HIST. STAT. U.S. tbl.Ea594-608, http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/table/ 
showtablepdf.do?id=Ea594-608 (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/AF3X-TX4E]. 
 64. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES:  A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE 
DEBATE OVER TAXES 18–22 (4th ed. 2008); King, supra note 35, at 21–23; see also 
THORNDIKE, supra note 17, at 207.  A similar pattern unfolded during the Civil War:  the 
North raised excise taxes substantially (particularly on luxury goods), but still had to 
establish an income tax to meet its revenue goals.  After the war was over, these new taxes 
only were gradually reduced. See MARGARET G. MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 158–59 (1970); Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 
in GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY:  A NEW HISTORY 188, 214 (Price Fishback 
et al. eds., 2007). 
 65. See infra APPENDIX Figure 1. 
 66. See infra APPENDIX Figure 1. 
 67. See infra APPENDIX Figure 2.  The author created Figure 2 based on the statistics 
found in John Joseph Wallis, Federal Government Internal Tax Revenue, by Source:  1863–
1940, HIST. STAT. U.S. tbl.Ea594-608, http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/table/ 
showtablepdf.do?id=Ea594-608 (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/8YYJ-X5TQ]. 
 68. See BROWNLEE, supra note 44, at 24, 29–30. 
2576 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
expanded income taxes.69  Federal sin taxes continued to be imposed, but 
their fiscal significance diminished.70 
The historical pattern is not as simple for state government revenues.  In 
1902, state taxes on the sale of alcoholic beverages and tobacco products 
generated no revenue at all.71  Instead, state governments relied heavily  on 
property-tax revenues.72  In 1913, taxes on the sale of alcohol provided only 
0.7 percent of total state revenues, while sales taxes on tobacco continued to 
provide zero revenues.73  In 1934, the contributions were 1.8 percent 
(alcohol) and 0.7 percent (tobacco), and by 1948 these increased to 3.4 
percent and 2.8 percent, respectively.74  By 1968, the proportions were 1.7 
percent (alcohol) and 2.8 percent (tobacco).75  Overall, these sin taxes 
generated zero state revenue at the outset of the twentieth century; their 
contribution then grew so that by mid century, they contributed a small but 
substantial amount of revenue; finally, their relative size shrank back down.  
Tax revenues from legalized gambling largely are a post-1960 phenomenon, 
and, with the exception of Nevada, only recently have revenues from 
casinos, lotteries, or pari-mutuel activity contributed substantially to state 
budgets.76 
Even as sin tax collections vary over time, they also vary across states.  
Some states impose higher taxes on stigmatized transactions than others.  In 
2015, for example, the tax rate on a gallon of distilled spirits was $12.80 in 
Alaska, $6.50 in Florida, and $8.55 in Illinois, whereas it was only $1.50 in 
Maryland and $2.28 in Colorado.77  Many states, including Alabama, Idaho, 
North Carolina, and Pennsylvania, directly control the sale of distilled 
spirits; accordingly, the state sets profit margins and also imposes fees and 
taxes.78  Hence, in 2014, Alabama gained about 2 percent of total tax 
revenues from alcoholic beverage sales taxes.79  The same sin tax generated 
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 71. State Government Tax Collections—Historical Dataset, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
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1.3 percent of total tax revenues for the state of Florida.80  The low rates 
imposed in Colorado produced little revenue:  alcoholic beverage sales 
provided only 0.3 percent of total tax revenues in 2014.81  Maryland’s low 
sin tax rates produced even less tax revenue, less than 0.2 percent of total 
tax revenues.82  The causes of these state-level variations have not been 
investigated thoroughly, but Cathy Johnson and Kenneth Meier found that 
religious groups make a difference for sin taxes:  U.S. states with larger 
Catholic populations tended to have lower alcohol taxes, while states with 
more Protestant fundamentalists were more likely to have state monopoly 
liquor stores (and less likely to have a state lottery).83 
These cross-jurisdictional and temporal variations in the fiscal magnitude 
of sin taxes underscore the loose coupling between symbolism and 
substance.  Cultural salience and fiscal significance are not the same 
thing.84  As a crude measure of cultural salience at the national level, 
consider evidence derived from the Google Ngram application, which 
summarizes the relative frequency of words and phrases contained in a very 
large corpus of digitized American English books.85  As with ordinary 
content analysis, word frequencies can be used to measure the importance 
of particular topics, and with a textual corpus that extends over long periods 
of time, word frequencies can measure how topics change over time.  
Figure 3 in the appendix simply is  a calibration test, showing that between 
1880 and 2000, published mentions of the word “prohibition” peaked in the 
period leading up to the repeal of the prohibition on the production and 
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distribution of alcoholic beverages and declined thereafter.86  Prohibition as 
a social and political issue was tracked by the relative frequency of the 
word “prohibition” contained in published books.  In this and subsequent 
graphs, the data are “smoothed” by using a seven-year moving average, but 
the overall pattern is the same when viewed without smoothing.87  This 
visible peak is consistent with the overall timeline of political and legal 
events preceding the passage and then repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution.88 
The evidence in Figure 4 is more relevant for my purpose here and charts 
the frequency of “alcohol tax” from 1880 to 2000.89  Although not as 
intense as the discussion of prohibition, the national conversation about 
taxes on alcohol waxes and wanes, with an increase during the late 1910s 
(just as federal alcohol revenues were declining in importance), becoming 
even more intense through the 1930s (after the end of prohibition), and then 
reaching a high point in the 1940s and into the early 1950s.  Thereafter, it 
settles down.  Figure 5 provides an interesting comparison between alcohol 
and cigarettes, both stigmatized commodities.90  Interest in cigarette 
taxation started in the 1920s and rose quickly through the late 1930s.  Then 
it declined and began to increase again in the mid-1940s, producing higher 
levels of published commentary in the early 1950s than did alcohol taxes at 
any point.91  Then, matters quieted down until the 1980s when the 
discussion began to rebound in intensity (perhaps because the health 
consequences of cigarette use had become so publicly undeniable). 
This simple textual evidence is only suggestive, of course, but it does 
reflect how much the collective discussion of “sinful” commodities has 
increased and decreased over time.  As an issue, such taxes do not create a 
steady state of controversy or durable deliberation.  It also shows that the 
fiscal importance of sin taxes does not drive, in any mechanical fashion, the 
cultural or political salience of sin taxes.  Indeed, once individual and 
corporate income taxes were put in place in response to wartime financial 
imperatives, excise taxes contributed relatively little to the federal budget.  
But the discussion of excise taxes imposed on sinful commodities 
nevertheless continued, and even intensified.  The symbolic connection 
between stigmatized activity and the tax revenues that can arise out of them 
remained intact, even when sin tax revenues made a relatively small 
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contribution to public finances and even when sin taxes were not a hot 
political issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Taxation involves legally mandated revenue streams coming from private 
economic assets and activity into the public purse.  Modern taxation 
involves streams of homogeneous, territorially bounded, fungible legal 
tender—streams that emerge from market-based activity.  But taxation is 
not simply a matter of resource extraction to pay for public policy.  In 
suggesting that taxes also can represent meaning, I borrow from Zelizer’s 
analysis of money,92 and the ways in which earmarking practices create 
categories and distinctions within flows of homogeneous money, at both 
their sources and destinations.  A tax revenue stream flowing out of 
stigmatized economic activity itself becomes stigmatized and is known as a 
“sin tax.”  It often is treated as categorically distinct, segregated in the 
budget from other revenues and frequently earmarked to cover particular 
categories of expense.  If a sin tax signals dishonor by its point of 
origination, it also can weaken that stigma through its earmarked 
destination, to be dispersed in payment of “motherhood and apple pie” 
public expenses.  These semiotic connections persist even when the sin tax 
contributes only a small proportion of total public revenues. 
My broader goal in this Article is to rethink the connection between 
taxation and representation.  Usually, this conjoint phrase refers to political 
representation, or the right of citizens to exercise their voting rights and 
have a say in how, and how much, they are taxed by municipal, state, or 
federal governments.  But here, I mean symbolic representation, 
underscoring that taxes can serve as a vehicle for the conveyance of 
collective or public meanings, not just for the deployment of purchasing 
power.  As many have previously noted,93 politics involves symbols and 
rituals.  The power of the democratic state consists of its ability to mobilize 
and deploy material resources, but it also possesses considerable cultural 
power.  Through its system of taxation, it renders the private economy 
legible, recognizes some of its moral features, and enacts with precision 
both approval and disapprobation.  If it is true that, following Cicero,94 
taxes are the sinews of the state, it is also true that they can serve as its 
voice. 
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Figure 3:  Relative frequency of “prohibition” 
in Google book corpus, 1880–2000 
 
 
Figure 4:  Relative frequency of “alcohol tax” 
in Google book corpus, 1880–2000 
 
 
Figure 5:  Relative frequency of “alcohol tax” and “cigarette tax 
in Google book corpus, 1880–2000 
 
